

Iuliu Maniu's two letters addressed to Cornel Bianu (1945)

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Summary

The first letter exposes Maniu's several complaints regarding the impossibility to have a close collaboration with Bianu (due to the censorship existed in Romania), the B.B.C. broadcasting of the Soviet points of view in the matter of Romanian political developments, the Soviet support for the illegitimate Groza government and the fact that Allies did not recognize Romania's war effort and that had determined the lack of possibility to have been granted United Nations membership.

The second letter presented Maniu and National Peasant Party's political activity during 1941-1944, the abuses committed by the Red Army throughout Romania from the end of 1944, the beginning of activity of Groza government's political police and that government incapacity to stop the decline of Romanian economy.

Key Words: Marshal Antonescu, Great Britain, censorship, communism, the National Peasant Party, Romania, Soviet Union.

Rezumat

În prima scrisoare, Iuliu Maniu prezintă o serie de nemulțumiri referitoare la imposibilitatea menținerii unei strânse colaborări cu Bianu (ca urmare a cenzurii existente în România), emisiunile radiofonice ale BBC în care se prezentau punctele de vedere sovietice în privința evoluției politice din România, sprijinul sovietic acordat ilegitalului guvern Groza și faptul că aliații nu au recunoscut efortul de război al României, iar aceasta determinase lipsirea de posibilitatea acordării statutului de țară membră a Națiunilor Unite.

În a doua scrisoare, este prezentată activitatea politică a lui Iuliu Maniu și a Partidului Național-Țărănesc în perioada 1941-1944, abuzurile comise

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de Armata Roșie pe teritoriul românesc începând cu sfârșitul anului 1944, începutul activității de poliție politică a guvernului Groza și incapacitatea acestui guvern de a stopa declinul economiei românești.

Cuvinte cheie: mareșalul Antonescu, Marea Britanie, cenzură, comunism,

Partidul Național-Țărănesc, România, Uniunea Sovietică.

The existence of Soviet censorship and customs, exercised on behalf of the Romanian Allied Control Commission, doubled also by the Romanian censorship and customs, did not allow, amongst many other restrictions, the possibility of Romanians to communicate freely with the rest of the world. Iuliu Maniu, the most prestigious Romanian democrat, politician and president of the National Peasant Party, tried to keep the collaboration with Cornel Bianu, his and his party's envoy in Great Britain during the World War Two. Iuliu Maniu used as intermediary of the present Letter 2 (written in Romanian) a certain Masterson, member of the British Mission at Bucharest, in order to be handed over to Cornel Bianu, resident in Great Britain; the latter was considered by John Le Rougetel, British Political Representative in Romania, as Maniu's representative in Western Europe³. The use of a British intermediary represented the avoidance of running the rule over by the Romanian customs and Soviet customs of the Romanian Allied Control Commission because the Soviets, the Americans and the British were members of this Commission (the United States and the United Kingdom were no more than honorary members in 1944 and 1945). Masterson passed on the letter to his head, Le Rougetel; in his dispatch, which accompanied the letter, Le Rougetel mentioned to D.F. Howard, Head of Southern Department in Foreign Office, although the letter had not been signed, it belonged to Maniu as it was delivered to Masterson ("as you will see, it is not signed but I have proof of its authenticity")⁴.

In Foreign Office, D.L. Stewart disagreed with Maniu's exaggerate importance during the war, although Romanian developments, presented within the letter, were true but Stewart disagreed with the passing on the letter to Bianu considering the British could not act as Maniu's agents and they would provoke a Soviet protest; the latter view found support and to his colleague, G. Mc Dermott⁵. Stewart wrote a draft to Le Rougetel, in

³ Romanian National Archives, Collection Microfiches England 1940-1945, envelope no. 102 (representing Public Record Office, Foreign Office, 371/48558), John Le Rougetel's dispatch of 4.09.1945 to D.F. Howard, microfiche 40.

⁴ *Ibidem*.

⁵ *Ibid.*, D.L. Stewart's handwritten note of 18.09.1945 and G. Mc Dermott's handwritten note of 20.09.1945 on the report „Political situation in Roumania” (R. 15623/28/37), mf.

which British representative was informed of the British refusal to pass on the letter to Bianu as the Soviet could detect Maniu's modality to keep contact with Bianu, Maniu's channel was probably not the only one to communicate with Bianu, the Romanian developments were already known by the British press, and Foreign Office disagreed of approaching Bianu⁶.

The letter translated into English (letter 2) was dated 27th August 1945, but there was no date on the original letter (in Romanian).

Letter 1 was found only in English.

All three letters are typed.

Letter 1

Copy

Bucharest, 27th April, 1945

Dear,

I am very disappointed that I have no news for such a long time from you personally or from the others in London. I received information from all other parts but none from you. I do not know what is going on in England as far as we are concerned. I note that B.B.C. reproduces without any control the things said against us in Moscow. All the base charges laid against us find an echo where you are, and none of the problems of the day are settled in our favour. None of our efforts or sacrifices are justly appreciated. Only God knows what the act of 23rd August cost us and it was the responsibility almost exclusively of our party. The Communists, however, without any right, claim it as theirs. Our exclusion from San Francisco⁷, our enormous losses on the front, our insupportable material contribution which is impoverishing us and threatening us with famine, our lack of any form of freedom, the pitiless arrests and the barbaric treatment of those arrested, exasperate everybody. I no longer know what to do for our poor people. Ex-legionaries are openly invited and received by the Communists while we are accused of being Fascists simple because we are not Communists. The present Government is odious and hated by everybody. We are very astonished that that the British and Americans limit themselves to platonic declarations of non-recognition with no practical consequences. Please excuse the haste in which I write. I learnt only at the last moment of the opportunity to write to you.

⁶ *Ibidem*, G. Mc Dermott's handwritten note of 27.09.1945 (in the name of W.G. Hayter, new Head of Southern Department) to John Le Rougetel, mf. 58.

D.L. Stewart's draft of 21.09.1945, mf. 59.

⁷ Representatives of 50 victorious nations met in San Francisco (April-June 1945) to complete the Charter of the United Nations; Romania was not invited and was granted the United Nations membership only on December, 14th, 1955.

I salute you all with brotherly affection. Your people are well. I embrace you.

(Sgd.) Juliu Maniu

*** Romanian National Archives, Collection Microfiches England 1940-1945, envelope no. 85, microfiche 126 (representing the microfiches of Great Britain, Public Record Office, Foreign Office, 371/48541, microfiche 126).

Letter 2

SECRET

PRESS OFFICE

Translation August 27th, 1945

I acknowledge the receipt of the letters you sent me on March 20th, and June 7th of this year. First of all, I would like to point out that is the fifth letter I have sent you this year. The others probably did not reach you.

In those letters I explained the situation with us and the measures which ought to be taken to improve this situation.

Certain questions could not be touched on in the letters for reasons of discretion and the uncertainty of means of communication. Throughout this time our thoughts were with you, and we are extremely grateful for the efforts you are making in the interests of our cause.

With regard to the situation in Roumania⁸, I will do as you request and summarise impartially the development of events up to August 23rd, 1944, and will show the situation created in Roumania, particularly in the year 1945.

Our action to extricate Roumania from the Axis and to rally her to the action of the United Nations began in the first days of 1941. At that time I got into touch with Hoare and Gunther⁹. In common accord with them I laid down what was to be the main objective of my future activity and that of my party, namely: the extrication of Roumania from the alliance with Germany. Once this objective was established, I began to pursue the action which was to lead to its fulfilment.

In consequence of the understanding with the English and American diplomats, who were shortly to leave our country, I established the possibility of permanent contact with the Allies in the event – which seemed imminent – of the breaking off of relations with our allies.

⁸ In the past, the British spelt "Roumania" (probably under the influence of the French spelling "la Roumanie") and the Americans "Rumania".

⁹ Reginald „Rex” Hoare, British Minister in Romania (1935-1941).

Franklin Mott Gunther, United States Minister in Romania (1937-1941).

The contact was established through Mr. A.G.G. de Chastelaine and was to be maintained permanently through Cairo. The friends who undertook to facilitate this contact were discovered and kept three years in prison under the threat of capital punishment (Rică Georgescu and his group). We succeeded in replacing the confiscated sets and in keeping up the contact, with the assistance of the telegraphist sent to us (Țurcanu). All the action undertaken had the approval of the Allied representatives (by wireless) and was carried out in agreement with them.

Within the country, I succeeded from the beginning in winning over to this action of vital importance for our country the Liberal Party, presided over by Mr. Constantin Brătianu, who loyally seconded me in all my activity. (On the other hand, Mr. Tătărescu took no part in any of this activity; on the contrary, he supported the former Marshal Antonescu even so far as to accompany him to Chisinau to celebration of the Roumanian victory over the Russians.)

The Roumanian Socialist parties, which we sounded with a view to rallying them to the action we had undertaken, proved themselves quite incapable of any action. (I would mention in passing that when I believed that the moment had come to show by a street demonstration Roumania's desire to conclude peace with the Allies, I demanded the help of the Communist Party, which declared itself the representative of Bucharest workers. On behalf of this Party, Mr. Pătrășcanu replied that if I could obtain the firm assurance that the Army and the Police would not fire on the the workers, he could promise the help of about 5 000 workers at such a demonstration). Apart from the preparation of the preliminaries for an Armistice, it was also the role of the National Peasant Party to prepare the public opinion within the country, terrorised as it was by the dictatorial measures of the Antonescu regime and the German occupation. The fighting traditions of the National Peasant Party determined me to envisage open action, as clandestine and underground work had never been the lines of our party policy. I regret to have to say that the Socialist parties, whose special method was underground action, did not succeed in collaborating even indirectly in our action, and thus we had to bear the shame of realising that throughout the German occupation in Roumania, not one act of sabotage was registered, nor was the slightest obstacle placed in the way of good functioning of German administration and transports destined for the front. On the contrary, all the leading figures of the Roumanian railways were awarded the "German Vulture" for unreserved collaboration in the Hitlerist war effort.

With regard to the propaganda action, our party carried this on most fully, and the Roumanian public reached the conclusion that our alliance

with Germany was a disaster, and that only the breaking off of this alliance could save the country.

To realize our main objective, we had to secure the collaboration of administrative authorities, of the Army – without which we could not cope with the terrorist methods of the German forces of occupation – and above all, of the King.

As far back as 1942, I talked to the King and won him over to our idea. I must assert that His Majesty was in agreement with us from the very beginning but, because of Antonescu and the Germans, he could not take an active part from the first moment, and I was therefore compelled to conduct the action alone at my own risk and on my own responsibility.

My decision to leave the country for London had to be abandoned, because I had no one to whom I could entrust the continuation of the action within the country. No one wished to take the risk, nor had anyone the authority to undertake anything in this direction. I personally had the advantage that not even the Germans had dared to arrest me, and in spite of their insistence with Antonescu, he did not wish to risk the consequences which my arrest might have entailed.

After I had obtained the King's consent to the objective proposed, my first care was to win over the Army for the same purpose. I began the difficult task of persuading all the great Army leaders to obey the orders of the King at a given signal, in the direction of the policy I advocated. The difficulty lay in the necessity for discretion, in the caution of the generals and in the developments on the front.

In the action conducted to win over the Army leaders, His Majesty's valuable help was decisive: through the head of his Military Household, General Sănătescu, he facilitated my contact with the leaders at the front.

In the action abroad, I obtained valuable help from some of our leading diplomats – chiefly Mr. Crețianu, Minister in Ankara, sent there at my request, and – at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs – the young diplomat Niculescu-Buzești, who from the very beginning placed himself at our service in his capacity as the Code Director and with the help of his personal connections among the diplomats, particularly those accredited to neutral countries, was able to render valuable service for the realization of our purpose. Through Mr. Niculescu-Buzești I was able to maintain permanent contact – by secret periodic communication made without the knowledge and over the heads of the Antonescu government – with our men in Berne, Stockholm and Lisbon.

In this diplomatic action I had the help of Titulescu's friends, particularly of Vișoianu and Savel Rădulescu.

I succeeded in obtaining pawns in key posts of the internal State administration, with the results that on the decisive day, the entire administration was firmly determined to collaborate in the projected coup d'état.

It is well to mention here that neither in the Army nor in the Administration nor in the Diplomatic Corps was there any defection.

After all this had been thoroughly prepared through laborious work which occupied my every hour, the time had come to establish the moment of action and the conditions to be assured us, should that action succeed.

To this end I sent to Cairo Prince Ştirbey, who with great patriotism assumed this grave responsibility and all its consequences. In consequence of his action, we began direct negotiations with the representatives of the three great powers in Cairo.

On April 9th, 1944, Prince Ştirbey communicated by telegram the conditions of the Armistice with between Roumania and the Allies, laid down in the communication of General Wilson on behalf of the three governments.

In this telegram the Allies requested as to inform Antonescu of the Armistice conditions, in the hope that he would be prepared to conclude the Armistice. I did so. After some days of hesitation, he refused the conditions. After the failure of the negotiations with the Marshal, I continued discussions with the Allied representatives, and to this I sent Vişoianu to Cairo to request the Allies to improve the conditions proposed. On April 19th I sent the following answer to the telegram laying down the Armistice conditions: "I agree to begin negotiations on the basis of the conditions proposed by the Allied powers and of my suggestions." Following on Vişoianu's negotiations in Cairo, I was informed that the Allies could not change the conditions, but they would make improvements in the execution if Roumania abandoned the Axis after I had received the conditions communicated by telegram from General Wilson. I then obtained the consent of the King and of my close collaborators, and replied that I accepted the conditions imposed, and that my action for the overthrow of the regime and the extrication of Roumania from the Axis would be carried out in agreement with the Allies and at the moment indicated by them. The following is a part of the telegram sent to Prince Ştirbey on June 11th, 1944: "Mr. Maniu agrees to the conclusion of an Armistice on the conditions presented by the Allies." At the same time it was communicated to me from Cairo that it would make a good impression on the Allies if in the action to overthrow the government I persuaded the Communist and Social Democratic Parties to associate (apart from the Liberal Party, which had supported me all

along.) I at once got into touch with these parties, which until that moment had taken no part under any form (apart from the attempt to form a weak coalition with such compromised elements as Tătărescu and Ralea under the aegis of Mihai Antonescu) and with them I formed on June 20th, 1944, the Democratic Block.

I would mention that the introduction of the Socialists and Communists into this action was effected on the express request of the Allies and after the preliminaries of the Armistice had already been laid down.

Following on all this, I awaited the Allies' reply in connection with the moment for the overthrow which, at our request, was to coincide with a Russian offensive. I also counted on support from the Allies who, at the moment of action, were to send a detachment of paratroopers.

The Russian offensive began in the meantime and, without waiting for a signal from the Allies, we arranged for a coup d'état to take place on August 26th. Owing to favourable circumstances, it took place three days earlier, on August 23rd, when our extrication from the Axis and the liberation of our territory from the Germans were achieved through our own effort.

The consequences of the act of August 23rd from a political and above all from a military point of view, were of an importance which no longer needs stressing. It is sufficient to recall that in consequence of this act the Russo-German front swung from the Prut up to the gates of Budapest almost without any military effort of any extent.

In view of the preliminaries to the act of August, 23rd, it was natural for our Armistice delegation to Moscow to sign the conditions laid down in Cairo, and for the promised improvements to take effect in their application. (In connection with these improvements, I would mention that, after the Armistice conditions had been communicated to us, Mr. Duca, our representative in Stockholm, had negotiated in our name for the improvement of the Cairo conditions with Mrs. Kollontay, the Soviet Ambassador to Stockholm. Mrs. Kollontay gave us assurances in this respect on behalf of the Soviet government, and even defined more advantageous economic conditions and the respecting of free zones not liable to occupation by Russian troops.) Instead of this, however, after three weeks' postponement, during which time our delegates waited without being able to begin the negotiations, we were compelled to sign much more burdensome armistice, in consequence of which the country is now completely exhausted, and the Armistice burdens grows daily, by unilateral interpretation. This Armistice was imposed by the representatives of Soviet Russia in the presence of the British and American delegates, who confined themselves to approving unreservedly all the conditions laid

down by the Russians. As an example of the incontestable difference between the Cairo preliminaries and the Moscow text. I need only point out that under the article "Maintenance of the Army", insupportable charges are laid on us today, which exceed the economic possibilities of the country.

From the point of view of internal politics, non-interference on the part of Russia, advocated in the negotiations and assured by the political declaration of 1944, has not been respected. Russian interferences in our internal affairs is evident, and indisputable proof is given daily of this fatal interference.

I think it is well to know that the Armistice concluded with the representatives of the Allied powers in Cairo was accepted on August, 23rd, 1944, when Mr. Niculescu-Buzești, Roumanian Minister for Foreign Affairs, sent Prince Știrbey the telegram empowering him, with Mr. Vișoianu, to sign the Armistice on the conditions agreed upon in Cairo.

On March, 6th, 1945, a Communist government was imposed on the country calling itself, to keep up appearances, a coalition government, formed of the Communist Party and insignificant groups created by that party under camouflage noses. This government, called a "National Democratic Front" government, does not represent even 10 % of the opinion of the country. To install it, Mr. Vyshinski, Soviet Minister Adjunct for Foreign Affairs, terrorised the King, who only under the pressure of serious threats consented to this formation. This government's methods of governing are absolutely dictatorial. For example, although the political parties have not been yet officially disbanded, any attempt at activity on the part of the National Peasant or National Liberal Parties are hampered and repressed by the arrest and internment of the participators.

The prisons are full of political prisoners, who have been deprived of their liberty on various unfounded charges. Concentration camps have been revived, in which apart (apart from the political prisoners interned by virtue of the obligation undertaken by the Armistice Convention) there are now 4 000 of our adherents, all old and tried democrats. On the other hand, former agents of previous dictatorships who have adhered to the Communist Party or to one groups created by it, are considered as purged of all guilt and are even appointed to important political posts. There is no end to house searches and summons to the State Security Police (all of whose members have been replaced by Communist agents, many of them foreigners and some of them even having been convicted of common law offences). The liberty of the subject and the protection of property are subject to their whims. At the Bucharest Police Prefecture at present are hundreds of people arrested, many of them leaders of the National

Peasant Party, arrested on the most improbable charges, of which the most usual is that of being a Hitlerist or a reactionary. With regard to the press, although there is a Roumanian and a Russian censorship, neither the National Peasant nor the National Liberal Party is allowed to have an organ of publicity. All the newspapers have been suspended, apart from the Communist papers and those which have guaranteed to pursue an uncamouflaged Communist policy. Hungarian papers, on the other hand, have been allowed to appear throughout the country. At the instigation of the leaders of the Communist Party, working printers refuse to print any non-Communist publication, even if it has the approval of the Russian and Roumanian censorship.

In the economic field, the Groza government has shown itself to be quite incapable of repressing profiteering. Financially, things are going from bad to worse. (A meal costs about Lei 10 000; an egg costs 160 Lei. Bread is hard to find and must be bought on the Black Market at Lei 400 a loaf.) The dollar rate on the Black Market is Lei 9 400.

We have more than a million Soviet soldiers in the country whom we must feed. People are in despair. Apart from the obligations imposed by the unilateral interpretation by the Russians of the Armistice, the Russian Army in Roumania continues its senseless devastation and pursues a policy which can only result in famine for the country.

In Northern Transylvania, the situation has become inconceivably tragic. Acts of revenge committed by the Hungarians on the Roumanian population are daily occurrences. The situation of the Roumanians is much worse than it was before August 23rd. Public posts are filled with Jews and Hungarians beyond the Tysza who, with the help of so-called political police, composed entirely of tried Communists, regardless of their origin or nationality, exercise unbearable terrorism over the Roumanian population.

Recently, on the occasion of the entry of the Roumanian Army into Cluj, the victory at the front was to be celebrated, when to the accompaniment of cries of "Down with the Wallachian Army". Hungarians, bearing weapons on the pretext of being Communist guards, fired into the Army, killing and wounding several people. Because the Army responded to this provocation, General Stănescu, their Commander, was dismissed, and full satisfaction was to the Hungarian Communists, who under a new style continue their policy of territorial claims and acts of revenge on Roumanian population. Prof. Emil Hațieganu, recently returned from German-Hungarian deportation, was also arrested and has not yet been released.

All the measures taken by the present government aim at the

elimination of the National Peasant and Liberal Parties from the political life. This is the interpretation which must be put on all the outpouring of the Communist press within the country and on the propaganda directed in bad faith from Moscow.

With regard to the Armistice concluded at Moscow, with all burdensome conditions imposed upon us, it has been observed by us down to the smallest detail. Instead of the 12 divisions we had undertaken to send against the Germans, we gave 19 divisions, an effective force of 320 000 soldiers and 27 000 officers and non-commissioned officers. Of these forces we lost 5 000 officers, 4 800 non-commissioned officers and 160 000 men, that is, more than half of the forces engaged. Our air force placed at the disposal of the Allied Command all its forces – 1 300 planes – which executed 4 300 task flights and 8 500 sorties at enemies, and sustained the loss of 340 crews. Our fleet did not go into action on its own, as it was sequestered by the Russians (5 monitors, 6 vedettes, 2 flagships, 2 tugs, 38 sloops, 15 barges, 5 destroyers, 3 gunboats, 12 tankers, and 30 sundry other vessels)¹⁰.

Through its own means the Roumanian Army took over 60 000 Germans prisoner in the first week after the Armistice. We put all of our means of transport at the disposal of the Soviet troops: 22 000 trucks and 252 heavy locomotives were taken away from us and have not yet returned. River-going vessels were taken for the use of Russians. We handed over German and Hungarian war materials as trophies of war, and were even obliged to repair those which were damaged. Over 10 000 motor vehicles were taken over by the Russian arbitrarily. The Supreme Soviet Command, in the application of art. 18 of the Armistice, has considered as enemy property and taken over and private inventory whose value exceeds 300 000 000 000 Lei. In the execution of the obligation to assure the function of the industries and deposits at the disposal of the Soviet troops, we have effected deliveries and rendered services, whereby all the obligations imposed have been fulfilled. For the upkeep of the army we delivered up to June 1st quantities which exceeded the obligations imposed and which amounted to about 40 000 trucks of foodstuff. Beyond that, over 4 000 trucks of foodstuff were delivered to the Russian troops returning from the front. This was over and above the deliveries to be effected on the basis of the general schedule. In respect of war reparations, by virtue of the convention of January 16th 1945, we entirely fulfilled the obligations,

¹⁰ Romanian contemporary historiography concluded the participation to the West Campaign with 538 536 men, the loss of 169 822 men (deceased, wounded or unfound), 126 000 men lost by the enemies (deceased or unfound), 4 306 task flights, 8 542 sorties at enemies etc (*Istoria românilor*, vol. IX, România între anii 1940-1947, Editor Dinu C. Giurescu, Bucureşti, Editura Enciclopedică, 2008, pp. 371-372).

delivering, over and above the quantities contracted, petrol products to the value of 200 000 dollars. In the application of art. 12 of the Armistice, we have restored most of the property taken from the USSR territory. But all property was demanded from us, regardless as to whether it was still consumable. They also demanded manufactured products if they originated from Russian territory. The value of the restitutions made up to now exceeds 237 milliards. Apart from the deliveries and restitutions made in accordance with the Armistice, property to the value of more than 500 milliards has been removed by the Russian Army and taken out from the country.

In spite of the desperate position of our country with regard to animals, the Soviet Army was taken 580 000 head of cattle, which exceeds more than half of the number of cattle taken by Roumania, not only from the Transnistria, but also from Bucovina and Bessarabia, in the period 1941-1944.

The financial effort made by Roumania in the execution of the Armistice Convention from September 1944 up to July 1st 1945, amounts to 433 and a half milliard Lei, and this sum comprises only half the expenditure, as, in the calculation of the sums, account was taken only of the items definitely liquidated in the State accountancy.

From a comparative list of the items in the State budget, it is clear that the maintenance of the State and of the Roumanian Army for this period amounts only to 423 milliard Lei, that is, less than the Armistice expenditure.

Apart from the Armistice Convention, Roumania is obliged to assure the maintenance, clothing and transport of the Soviet prisoners liberated in Germany and Hungary in their transit through Roumania.

I have given a few data with regard to the execution of conditions and obligations undertaken by Roumania. The execution of the conditions and obligations undertaken by Soviet Russia leaves much to be desired. I would mention that in spite of the express stipulation of the Armistice Convention, the Roumanian administration was removed from Transylvania, which was placed under Russian administration until the Groza government was formed. On many occasions the Soviet Army has intervened in political controversies to support the Communist Party. At the moment there are more than 1 000 000 Soviet soldiers quartered in various zones of the country, and the intention is to keep them indefinitely. The very presence of these masses of troops in our country makes the normal development of our economical and political life impossible.

In accordance with the decision of the Allies, the present government has not been recognized, but it is still maintained and strengthened by the

Russians through public action destined to guarantee the prolongation of its existence.

From this succinct and incomplete exposition of the state of things in Roumania, you will certainly draw the conclusion that in order to assure the free and normal development of our country, and above all, to assure her independence and sovereignty, it is essential that the Soviet troops should leave the country, that the Communist government imposed by Moscow against the overwhelming majority of Roumanian public opinion should be removed without delay and replaced by a government of experts or a coalition government capable of assuring free elections and of representing Roumania at the Peace Conference. You must know that owing to the fact that at Potsdam it was not declared expressly that the Roumanian government is not recognized, this government continues in being, and its representatives declare emphatically that Russian influence will determine its recognition. These things, and other to be drawn from them, corroborated by information which can reach London with regard to the state of things in Roumania, should be known to the decisive factors in British politics.

Roumania expects Great Britain to speak a decisive word with regard to Roumania, and that her categorical attitude should not be couched in vague communiqués which allow of various interpretations, and which furnish indirect arguments for the maintenance of a situation which is unnatural and profoundly harmful to Roumanian interests.

I thank you for your activity so far and beg you, in the light of what I have told you here, to do your best to make our cause known to English circles. Please accept my best wishes and the assurance of my particular esteem.

*** Romanian National Archives, Collection Microfiches England 1940-1945, envelope no. 102, microfiches 41-50 (representing the microfiches of Great Britain, Public Record Office, Foreign Office, 371/48558, microfiches 41-50).